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Abstract
In this paper we first offer a task analysis of the false belief test including the bidirectional
relationship between mindreading and language. Following this we present our theory concerning
Quinian bootstrapping of the meaning of mental state terms and relate it to the task-analytic
framework. Finally we present an experiment on ascribing privileged access through minimal
narratives which is intended to serve as a test of our theory.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present a theory concerning the acquisition of mental state terms and their
usage in the explanation and prediction of behaviour. In order to see the broader context of
our theory first we discuss the task analysis of the famous false belief test. This is important
because one can interpret the passing of this verbal test as a manifestation of the possession
of the mental term of belief. As we are interested in the acquisition of mental terms, in
our task analysis we will focus on the bidirectional relationship between mindreading and
language. Following this we present our theory of Quinian bootstrapping of the semantics
of mental state words. We will see that the third stage of this bootstrapping process is
the formation of a so-called folk functionalist theory of mental state terms. We describe
an experiment that we did in order to examine the formation this folk functionalist theory.
This experiment addressed the understanding of the notion of privileged access in children.
We were curious whether children can explain and predict the behaviour of protagonists in
minimal narratives; to this end we examined the usage of mental state terms in our subjects’
interpretation of a character’s behaviour in those narratives.
2 The task analysis of the false belief test
During the last thirty five years there has been an explosion of research into the naïve
theory of mind (ToM) of primates, children and adults. At present, research in this area is
conducted under various different labels within the cognitive sciences such as naïve psychology,
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intuitive psychology, everyday psychology, common sense psychology, folk psychology, belief-
desire psychology, natural psychology, interpretation, mentalization, metarepresentation and
mindreading. In the present paper, we shall use these terms as roughly synonyms. By theory
of mind we mean the basic ability to attribute or impute mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires,
intentions, thoughts, emotions and so on) to ourselves and others in order to explain, predict,
interpret and influence the behaviour.
In everyday life there are a lot of occasions where we read the minds of other people
around us. One such situation is the classic false belief scenario. The famous false belief
task was suggested by philosophers (e.g., [12]) in response to [17] question concerning the
possibility of the chimpanzee’s theory of mind. At that time, philosophers thought that
the real criterion of theory of mind is the case when the organism can ascribe a mental
state to the other which is different from its own. This is the situation in the classic change
of location false belief task [24]. In this task, children watch the following scenario: Maxi
puts his chocolate in location A in the kitchen and then leaves the scene. In his absence,
his mother removes the chocolate from location A and puts it in location B. Then Maxi
returns and the child is asked where he will search for his chocolate. The basic finding is
that three-year-olds say that Maxi will look for his chocolate in the new B place while only
four-year-olds can correctly indicate location A in their verbal responses.
Why do three-year-olds fail on this task and what are the cognitive requirements of
passing this test at four years of age? In other words, what kind of task analysis can we
provide for the success on this false belief test? At present, there are nearly twenty different
cognitive explanations for these questions and the most important ones are listed below.
1. According to Leslie (e.g., [39]), humans have an innate theory of mind module which
manifests itself in pretend play between 18-and 24-month-of-age. In Leslie’s view, this
innate mindreading module is not sufficient to pass the famous false belief test because
the latter also requires the so-called selection processor which is responsible for inhibiting
the reality-based response (i.e., that the chocolate is in location B). So three-year-olds
have an intact theory of mind module but their selection processor does not yet work
appropriately. The opposite is true in the case of children with autism: these children
do not have a mindreading module but they possess a selection processor which is at
work when these children pass the false photograph test. So children with autism can
represent public, external representation such as an outdated photograph and their deficit
is specifically with representing mental states. In other words, they have a domain-specific
deficit.
2. According to Perner [29], passing the false belief test requires metarepresentational ability
on the child’s part. Perner explicitly commits himself to Fodor’s Representational Theory
of Mind [3] which simply holds that mental states are representational states. So when the
child forms a representation about a representational state such as a belief, she constructs
a metarepresentation. This is not enough, however, for managing on false belief tasks.
Following Frege, Perner argues that in order to pass the false belief task the child needs to
understand the distinction between the reference and sense of a representation. In his task
analysis the four-year-old child understands that the reference of Maxi’s representation is
that the chocolate is in location B while the sense of his mental representation is that the
chocolate is in location A. And the child believes that Maxi will act in accordance with his
sense of representation.1. According to Leslie (e.g., [39]), humans have an innate theory
of mind module which manifests itself in pretend play between 18-and 24-month-of-age.
In Leslie’s view, this innate mindreading module is not sufficient to pass the famous
false belief test because the latter also requires the so-called selection processor which is
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responsible for inhibiting the reality-based response (i.e., that the chocolate is in location
B). So three-year-olds have an intact theory of mind module but their selection processor
does not yet work appropriately. The opposite is true in the case of children with autism:
these children do not have a mindreading module but they possess a selection processor
which is at work when these children pass the false photograph test. So children with
autism can represent public, external representation such as an outdated photograph and
their deficit is specifically with representing mental states. In other words, they have a
domain-specific deficit.
3. Apperly [10] argues that the central feature of the false belief test is perspective-taking.
In order to pass this test the child needs to adopt the perspective of Maxi and predict the
searching behaviour on this basis. In other words, the child must overcome her egocentric
bias that the chocolate is in location B.
4. According to Gopnik and Wellman [8], the false belief test requires the concept of belief.
On their view, concepts are embedded within intuitive theories. A crucial feature of
cognitive development is that these naïve theories change. In fact, this whole research
field is called theory of mind which shows the influence of this particular, so-called
theory-theory position.
5. A further analysis of the false belief test builds on the notion of executive functions.
‘Executive function’ is an umbrella term covering, among other things, the following
notions: the inhibition of pre-potent responses, planning, the temporal organisation
and monitoring of actions, sequencing behaviour, sustained attention, working memory,
impulse control, etc. Within the false belief test the executive component is the inhibition
of the reality-based response (the chocolate is in location B). This executive element is
similar to the above discussed task of the selection processor.
6. It is important to realise that the false belief test eventually is a kind of narrative. So it
should come as no surprise that if we highlight the story component of the false belief
scenario then even three-year-olds are able to pass the task [11].
7. According to the task analysis of Frye, Zelazzo and Palfai [13], the false belief task can
be broken down to understanding of conditionals. If Maxi wants to find his chocolate
then he should search at location A. Indeed, these authors report significant correlations
between the understanding of conditional statements and passing the false belief test.
8. De Villiers and de Villiers (e.g., [22]) provided experimental evidence to support the
thesis that the acquisition of the syntax of the so-called complement-taking predicates is
a cognitive prerequisite for passing the false belief test. Deaf children whose parents are
not using any sign language are delayed at the false belief test.
9. According to Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, and Mitchell [30], there is a strong correlation
between passing the false belief test and understanding of counterfactual statements.
Within the false belief scenario the real situation is that the chocolate is in location B
and the case that Maxi should look for location A is counterfactual with respect to this
actual case.
10. We have seen above that in order to pass the false belief task children must possess the
concept of belief. Where does this concept come from? According to Paul Harris [35],
the child needs to participate in conversations and she can construct the notion of belief
from these dialogues. So the experience in participating in conversations is a necessary
precondition of passing the false belief test.
11. Both Paul Harris and Alvin Goldman [27] are committed to the so-called simulation
theory of mindreading. According to them, the child can pass the false belief test via a
kind of mental simulation in which she uses her own mind introspectively to predict the
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protagonist’s behaviour. In doing so, the child can rely on her imaginary identification
with the protagonist.
12. The specific role of introspection in passing the false belief test is not restricted to
simulation theory. Kuhn [15] also argues that self-observation plays a decisive role in
the accomplishment of this task. On this view, the child forms the concept of belief via
introspection.
13. In Fonagy’s (e.g., [46]) view, there is a strong correlation between the security of attach-
ment as measured by the strange situation in infancy and the age at which children can
pass the false belief test. In fact, secure children can pass this task earlier than their
insecure peers.
14. Astington [59] provides a social constructivist account of mindreading which is necessary
for passing the false belief task. On this view, the concept of false belief emerges first
at the interpersonal level and only later does it become interiorised into the individual’s
mind.
15. According to Fodor [4], folk psychology is innate and the basic inborn mindreading
apparatus is present in the competence of the three-year-old child but at the same time
she has performance limitations such as different cognitive heuristics which mask this
competence. Moreover, Fodor suggests various hypothetical experiments in order to
confirm his view.
16. There exists an explanation according to which the false belief test is a kind of meta-
memory task. Notice, that in order to pass this task the child must attribute a memory
to Maxi (i.e., He remembers where he put his chocolate at the beginning.)
17. A further explanation of the success on this test requires the notion of intention. The
argument being simply that Maxi wants to find his chocolate. So this task involves the
ascription of intention to the protagonist.
18. Dan Sperber (e.g., Sperber et al. [20]) argues that the false belief test can be approached
as a task of epistemic vigilance. On this view, it is an important cognitive developmental
achievement when the child gives up her basic trust that played an important role in early
communication and begins to take into account the possibility of misleading information
such as a lie or error.
19. Finally, Helming, Strickland and Jacob [32] argue that the classic false belief task is a
normative task, that is, three-years-olds interpret the test question as “Where should
Maxi look for his chocolate?” And the correct answer to this question is location B (since
that is the actual location, and arguably it is a norm that one should look for something
where it actually is).
By this quick review of positions we intend to illustrate why Bloom and German [43] are
right when they suggest to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind. On the
one hand, the classic false belief test contain elements that are not specific to theory of mind
(e.g., executive functions), and on the other, there are important mindreading developments
before passing this task (e.g., understanding visual perspective). These different explanations
are summarised in Table 1.
We collected the cognitive explanations of the verbal false belief task. Since 2005 we have
a growing body of experimental evidence concerning the infants’ ability to attribute false
beliefs to others (e.g., Kovacs et al. [1]; Onishi and Baillargeon [34]) as it is demonstrated in
various non-verbal tasks. These violations-of-expectations experiments are subject to different
interpretations. One of them is that infants have an implicit theory of mind. Indeed, Onishi
and Baillargeon argue that 15-month-old infants have a representational understanding of
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Table 1 Cognitive explanations of the false belief test
Authors Explanations Evidence
Leslie Innate theory of mind module Theoretical and experimental
Perner Metarepresentation Conceptual and experimental
Apperly Perspective-taking Experimental
Gopnik and Wellman Conceptual change Experimental
Russell Executive functions Experimental
Lewis Narratives Experimental
Kuhn Introspection Theoretical
Frye, Zelazzo and Palfai Understanding of conditionals Experimental and correla-
tional
De Villiers The syntax of complement-
taking predicates
Experimental
Harris Conversations Observations
Riggs Understanding of counterfac-
tuals
Experimental and observa-
tional
Fonagy Secure attachment Experimental and observa-
tional
Goldman Simulation and imaginary
identification with the protag-
onist
Philosophical and experi-
mental
Astington Social constructivism Experimental
Fodor Cognitive heuristics Hypothetical experiments
Metamemory Conceptual
Attribution of intention to the
protagonist
Conceptual
Sperber Epistemic vigilance Experimental
Jacob The test as a normative task Conceptual
mind. Ruffman and Perner [57] provide an alternative, strictly behavioural explanation to
this rich interpretation.
At present there are various attempts to explain the existing gap between early mindread-
ing and later success on the verbal false belief task. For instance, one such attempt is Alan
Leslie’s theory of an innate mindreading module and his selection processor discussed above.
3 The relationship between social cognition and language
What is the connection between mindreading and language? The relationship between
social cognition and language is in the focus of several researchers (see e.g., Astington and
Baird, [60]). One view is that certain mindreading abilities are the cognitive prerequisites
for acquiring language. Below, we offer a rough summary of these different theory of mind
preconditions and the various aspects of language being explained by them.
1. According to Bloom [42], understanding of the speakers’ referential intention is necessary
for word learning. To put this into a broader perspective we can say that the acquisition
of the mental lexicon is dependent upon one’s theory of mind.
2. Baldwin (Baldwin and Moses, [2]) demonstrated experimentally that older infants can
take into account the other’s direction of gaze when they learn a new word. This means
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that in a situation where there are more new objects present infants will attach the heard
new label to that particular object to which the speaker paid attention rather than that
the one they themselves looked at. So again learning a new word requires theory of mind
ability; in this case the understanding of attention.
3. Tomasello [19] argues that the so-called nine-month-olds’ revolution in understanding
intentions is a cognitive prerequisite for language acquisition. At nine-month-of-age
infants begin to demonstrate volitional behaviour and this is the base on which they can
ascribe intentions to other people around them. Theoretically speaking, this is a kind of
mental simulation by which the infants understand others.
4. Beckwith [56] claims that the emergence of the concept of other minds is a precondition
for the formation of the so-called Experiencer thematic role. Thematic roles (such as
Agent, Theme, Experiencer, Goal, etc.) are the semantic labels for various arguments
in the predicate-arguments linguistic theories. In particular, the so-called psychological
verbs (such as fear, love, hate) take the Experiencer role as one of their arguments.
5. Hamvas [21] presented experimental evidence showing significant correlation between
passing the false belief test and detecting the violation of Gricean conversational maxims.
So we can argue that the concept of false belief is required for certain pragmatic abilities.
6. Similarly, Happé [26] showed that the notion of false belief is necessary for understanding
metaphors. In fact, she experimentally tested the basic tenets of Relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson, [18]) arguing for the mindreading basis of conversational pragmatics
(see also Kiss, [53]).
7. Győri [38] also presented experimental evidence for his view that mindreading is a
prerequisite for understanding irony.
These different positions are summarised in Table 2. But the above list is only one side of
the coin. The other side is that many linguistic factors play a role in the emergence of theory
of mind. Below, we summarize these linguistic prerequisites and the elements of mindreading
that are explained by them. So we can conclude that the connection between mindreading
as a micro-level phenomenon and language (as a macro-level phenomenon) is a bidirectional
one.
1. Astington and Baird [60] collect various papers which all claim that language matters
for theory of mind. Their book came out in the same year when Onishi and Baillargeon
[34] reported their experimental findings concerning the infants’ implicit theory of mind
discussed above. So, of course this book cannot address the issue of the existence of a
preverbal mindreading competence.
2. Within the task analysis of the well-known false belief test we saw the strong and
provocative proposal by de Villiers and de Villiers [22] according to which the syntax of
complementation is necessary for passing this test. So they view syntax as a linguistic
precondition of mature theory of mind.
3. We have also discussed Harris’s [35] theory that claims that conversations are inevitable
for the mental construction of belief. Here again we can see that some kind of linguistic
practice is responsible for certain social cognitive achievements.
4. O’Neill [33] argues that the linguistic given/new distinction is mandatory for the develop-
ment of certain pragmatic skills. But it should be noted that since the pioneering work
of Paul Grice pragmatics and mindreading are so closely connected that one can hardly
disentangle these two basic competences.
5. In a relatively early work, Astington [58] dealt with the connection between narratives and
the child’s developing theory of mind. Of course, it is needless to say that the ascription
of mental states to the protagonist is a central feature of all stories.
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Table 2 Social cognitive prerequisites for language
Authors Special mindreading abil-
ity
What aspect of language
is explained
Bloom Understanding referential in-
tention
Word learning
Baldwin Gaze-following Acquisition of the lexicon
Tomasello Nine-month-olds’ revolution
in understanding intentions
Word learning
Beckwith The emergence of the concept
of other minds
Formation of the Experiencer
thematic role
Kiss Sz. Passing the false belief test Relevance theory
Hamvas E. Passing the false belief test Grice: Conversational maxims
Happe Passing the false belief test Understanding metaphors
Győri M. General theory of mind Understanding irony
Table 3 Linguistic prerequisites for social cognition.
Author Linguistic prerequisites What aspect of mindread-
ing is explained
Astington and Baird Language in general Theory of mind
DeVilliers Syntax Passing the verbal false belief
test
Harris Conversations The emergence of the concept
of belief
O’Neill The given/new distinction Pragmatics
Astington Narratives Mindreading stories
Kiss Lexical semantics The meaning variance of men-
tal terms
6. Kiss [54] describes the acquisition of the meaning of mental terms within the so-called
theory of mind research field. (See also the next section of the present paper for more
details on this.)
These views are presented in Table 3. In this section we looked at answers to the following
general question: What is the exact role of language in the formation of theory of mind? As
our primary interest in this paper is the acquisition of mental state terms, we would like to
offer another five possible theoretical roles for language in ToM.
1. First, one could suggest that language in general, and the mental terms in particular, are
merely labels for our independently existing concepts (Fodor, [5], [6]).
2. Second, we may assume that language is an “invitation to form categories”, thereby
playing a facilitatory role
3. Third, R. Mitchell ( [48], p. 41) says in the spirit of Wittgenstein ( [36], par. 384): “In
a sense, language creates mental states: “You learned the concept “‘pain’ when you
learned language” Note however, that in this quotation Wittgenstein refers to concepts,
but Mitchell is concerned with mental states in general.
4. Fourth, language may be taken as a replacement of expressive behaviour.
5. Fifth, language can be understood as a medium for representing mental states.
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4 Quinian bootstrapping of mental terms
Now we would like to explore the role of Quinian bootstrapping in the acquisition of the
meanings of mental terms such as “happy”, “think”, “believe” etc. Let us briefly introduce
Quinian bootstrapping as developed by Carey ( [50], [51]). From Carey’s analysis we pick
out the importance of a placeholder structure. The placeholder structure consists of symbols
whose meanings are initially determined in relation to each other. In this structure, many
symbols are connected to each other and these connections are represented in long-term
memory. At the beginning of the bootstrapping process the symbols have no meaning
but later the so-called modelling processes give meaning to these symbols. According to
Carey, these modelling processes can be analogy, inductive inference, thought experiment,
abduction. Carey introduced Quinian bootstrapping in her explanation of the acquisition
of numeral list representation and rational number as well as certain aspects of intuitive
physics. Quinian bootstrapping makes possible the creation of new representational systems
with novel concepts that were not available in the earlier conceptual machinery. In a word,
Quinian bootstrapping underlies radical conceptual change both in the history of science
and individual development.
How can we characterise the meaning of mental state terms? Folk functionalism is an
intuitive theory in which the meanings of mental terms are organised. According to this
common sense functionalist theory, the meaning of a mental term consists of the input and
output conditions of the given psychological state as well as the mental state’s connections
to other mental states. For instance, the meaning of the term pain consists of the cause of
the pain (e.g. touching a hot stove), the pain’s relationship to other mental states (the desire
to get rid of the pain) and the pain’s connections to behaviour (pain elicits wincing).
How does the child learn the meaning of mental terms? On the first stage of the
ontogenetic acquisition of the semantics of mental terms the child already uses mental terms,
but she is not fully aware of their meanings yet. At this stage the child uses mental terms
referring to the behavioural components of the mental state only. For instance, the term
happiness refers only to behavioural manifestations such as a smile. This phenomenon is
called semi-successful reference by Beckwith [56]. This is consistent with Wittgenstein’s
view according to which the attribution of mental states is always based on behavioural
criteria. The phenomenon of semi-successful reference of mental terms is also in line with
Wittgenstein’s well-known remark that we use words whose meanings become clear only
later.
Clearly, in this case we can see the learning process of Quinian bootstrapping at work.
One of the central components of this bootstrapping process is the existence of a placeholder
structure (see above). According to Carey, the meaning of a placeholder structure is provided
by relations among external, explicit symbols. In our case, these external, explicit symbols
are mental words and expressions represented in the child’s long-term memory. So, the child
represents many mental words and lexical items whose full and complete meanings become
available only at later stages of this bootstrapping process.
Carey [51] asks one of us what kind of evidence do we have in order to support this
first stage in the acquisition of mental terms? Here and now we can provide an anecdotal
evidence for this stage. Once one of us observed a two-year-old girl who was clearly playing
with her mother’s scarf and during this play she put it around her neck and said: “I have a
sore throat.” This observation is consistent with the view that at the beginning the child
uses external, behavioural criteria for attributing a mental state to herself. Furthermore, P.
Mitchell et al. ( [47], p. 329.) writes:” Indeed, children’s earliest use of mentalistic terms
usually links with observable behaviour”.
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At the second stage of the change of meaning of mental terms the child discovers the
inner subjective component (feeling or qualia) of mental lexical items and she realises that
the reference of mental terms includes this component. In other words, the child recognises
the phenomenological or experiental qualities of mental terms. So within this recognition
introspection serves as a kind of modelling process using Carey’s terminology of Quinian
bootstrapping. In this stage, mental terms have gone through meaning variance in relation
to the first stage, but the child does not yet possess the full representation of the meaning of
mental terms found in the folk functionalist theory (see [52] for more details).
The third stage is the acquisition of this common sense functionalist theory. It is the
result of a long learning process during which the child comes to understand the relationship
between mental states and their eliciting conditions and the interconnections of mental
states to each other and to their behavioural consequences. This is the acquisition of a
coherent theory by which the child understands specific causal processes such as the fact
that perception leads to the fixation of beliefs, or that beliefs can bring about other beliefs
by means of inference and that beliefs and desires cause actions together.
Later in this paper we present an experiment in which we tested the working of this
folk functionalist theory in children from 5- to 7 years of age. In that experiment we were
interested in how children can explain a protagonist’s behaviour by citing mental states. In
other words, we asked how children use mental terms in order to explain or predict behaviour.
In sum, mental terms go through changes of meaning during semantic development.
The successive naïve psychological theories of children determine the meanings of mental
terms. This meaning variance of mental terms is similar to the meaning variance of scientific
terms discussed by philosophers of science (e.g., [45]). (In fact, we have borrowed the
expression of meaning variance from this philosophical tradition.) As identical terms gain
different meanings in different theories, the changes of meaning lead to the problem of
incommensurability between various theories. In this way, we can extend the notion of
incommensurability to the child’s developing theories of mind as well (see [54]).
We have presented the theory of the meaning variance of mental terms in cognitive
development. We briefly touched upon the role of introspection in the acquisition of the
meaning of mental terms and at the same time we committed ourselves to the so-called
theory-theory of mindreading. So the question remains what is the proper role of introspection
in the development of theory of mind? As we said above, a crucial aspect of the Quinian
bootstrapping of learning the semantics of mental terms is the so-called modelling process by
which the mental terms represented in long-term memory get their meanings. And in our
view, this modelling process is a kind of introspection. On the one hand, toddlers or young
children have mental concepts (e.g., such as a belief); on the other, they have many mental
terms in their memory. The cognitive task for the developing child is to find a mapping
between the concepts and the mental terms. This mapping is achieved via self-observation.
In a word, we do not hold the provocative view of Gopnik [7] according to which first-person
self-knowledge is illusory or the less radical approach of Carruthers [44] which claims that
the mind is not transparent to itself. As we said before introspection has an important role
to play in the acquisition of the meaning of various mental terms.
In our view, the best approach to the development of mindreading is a complex of
introspection-based simulation and theory-theory. Our commitment to theory-theory is a
kind of semantic determination because we emphasize that both mental concepts and words
are embedded in coherent intuitive theories. In addition, the role of introspection as discussed
above leads us to accept simulation theory (e.g., [27]).
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5 The cognitive developmental investigation of the attribution of
privileged access to mental states
Experimental studies of privileged access originate from work by Jürgen Habermas. Within
the framework of universal pragmatics developed by Habermas the notion of the ideal speech
situation plays a crucial role. In our earlier work [53], we discussed this concept from the
point of view of the empirical research on theory of mind in children. Here we would like
to address one important aspect of the ideal speech situation, namely that we attribute
privileged access to the other person concerning her intentional states. Furthermore, we
assume that the other person is able to verbally report these mental states. In other words,
we tend to assume that in this ideal situation the other subject has infallible inner eye for
her psychological states. This in fact means that we attribute an ability of introspection,
therefore first-person authority, to other people. The objects of introspection are intentional
states, mental states, certain propositional attitudes (like belief, desire, etc.), psychological
states, reasons, intentions, motives, thoughts, emotions, etc.
In this idealisation we do not assume inaccessible, unconscious mental states; instead we
assume that the mind of the other is transparent to itself. It is important to see that this
is a kind of accountability and eventually responsibility. However, this idealisation exists
only in folk psychology because many theorists within psychology deny first-person authority.
(See e.g. the whole school of psychoanalysis, [44, 7, 49, 16, 25], and the famous work of
Wittgenstein).
What is the relationship between ToM and the attribution of privileged access? From
the point of view of empirical research we would like to mention two points. First, within
the research on theory of mind development different experiments focus on the questions
of how and when children become able to recognise mental states as the reasons or causes
of behaviour. These experiments presuppose that once the child comes to recognise that
intentional states underlie actions she immediately imputes privileged access to those mental
states.
Second, these experiments also presuppose that when the child interprets the other
person’s behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires, she also presumes that the verbal report
of the other concerning the intentional states behind the behaviour would correspond to
these mental states; that is to say the child does not take self-deception or confabulation
into consideration at the beginning.
Gergely (personal communication) raises the possibility that intentional causation and the
above-discussed idealisation are conceptually inseparable. First let us see the option when we
take this to be the case. We can only say that this is probably true from a developmental point
of view. One of the most important milestones within the research on social representation is
the empirical work by Moscovici [55] cited by László [28] that reports the finding according
to which Freudian concepts appear in the folk psychology of adults. From this research we
know that the notion of the unconscious is present within the everyday reasoning about
human action in adults. This implies that adults do not always assume accountability and
the ideal speech situation. On the contrary, they tacitly assume that there may exist reasons
or other intentional causes which, although play an important role in causing action, are not
accessed in a privileged fashion (and hence are not reportable).
From this point of view it is a very important question how the child gives up the ideal
speech situation and when she comes to suppose unconscious intentional reasons behind
action. We do not know of any empirical data relevant to this issue. Flavell et al. [23]
examined the understanding of the unconscious by children. According to their results, this
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understanding develops in the early elementary school years but this investigation did not
address the understanding of the unconscious causes of action in children. It seems that the
abandonment of the ideal speech situation is the result of cultural learning.
Of course, according to the second theoretical option intentional causal understanding
and idealisation are conceptually separate even in ontogenesis. Let us look at one aspect of
this idealisation according to which the child presumes accountability of intentional actions.
It is possible that children first understand that mental states cause behaviour and only
later do they assume that others can verbally report on intentional states. Maybe the ideal
speech situation in this sense requires the active participation in conversations. It is worth
noting again that Paul Harris [35] argues that the understanding of belief in three-year-olds
is due to the fact that these children already have enough active experiences of conversations.
According to him, the two-year-old child forms the mental concept of desire due to her own
agency. From the vantage point of the ideal speech situation two-year-old children could
understand desire as a mental state but they do not assume that the other person is able to
verbally report on it. At this age the child is not able to anticipate imaginary conversations
and she could expect the ideal speech situation later only on the basis of internalisation of
dialogues and the development of imagination.
In our earlier work [61] we studied the relationship between the attribution of privileged
access and perspective taking. In the experiment reported below we used a different method to
investigate the attribution of privileged access and by implication the ontogenetic emergence
of the ideal speech situation. We place the exploration of the attribution of privileged access
into the framework of experimental philosophy. It is worth mentioning that in the novel
collection of traditional and experimental philosophical papers [9] naïve theory of mind plays
an important role.
Our research questions are the following: When and how do children impute privileged
access to others concerning their mental states? What is the relationship between ToM and
the attribution of privileged access? In other words, is mindreading a necessary condition
of the attribution of privileged access? Or to put it slightly differently, is theory of mind a
prerequisite for the ascription of privileged access?
It is worth mentioning that P. Mitchell et al. [47] studied the emergence of privileged access
in children and found that even five-year-olds assigned more self-knowledge to themselves
than to an adult. This means that 5-year-olds have an understanding of first-person authority.
This study, however, did not investigate the attribution of privileged access to others, only
to oneself. We explored the attribution of privileged access through minimal narratives. In
this experiment, we studied the relationship between mindreading, privileged access and
understanding non-literary narratives. Today we witness many attempts to study the different
aspects of this relationship. One particular and well worked-out example is the work of Hutto
[14]. He argues that the most important part of common-sense psychology is its narrative
nature. At the same time, the connection between theory of mind and literary narratives is
also an essential research topic within contemporary cognitive science (see e.g. [37]). This
relationship is a very important issue in contemporary cognitive narratology. The attribution
of mental states (i.e. ToM.) and privileged access to the protagonist is a central feature of
all stories. According to Bruner [41], there are two psychological landscapes in every story.
The landscape of action consists of the arguments of an action, i.e. its actor, intention,
goal, situation, etc. whereas the landscape of consciousness comprises the mental states (e.g.
knowledge, belief, feeling, thinking) of the participants. In the experiments reported below,
both landscapes played an important role. So far we have seen that understanding narratives
has relevance for passing the famous false belief test and the connection between language
and mindreading.
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6 Experiment
6.1 Methods
Subjects. Seventy five children participated, in the experiment: 25 5-year-olds (mean age:
5:4, range 5:0 to 5:9; 14 boys and 11 girls), 25 6-year-olds (mean age: 6:6, range 6:0 to 6:11;
10 boys and 15 girls), and 25 7-year-olds (mean age: 7:3, range 6:0 to 9:0; 12 boys and 13
girls). The 5-year-olds and the 6-year-olds attended preschools in Pécs, Hungary and the
7-year-olds were first graders also in Pécs in Hungary.
Materials and procedure. We used two stories from the study of Bartsch and Wellman [31]
and we added a privileged access question to each of them. The first story is the following:
“Here is Jane. Jane is looking for her kitten. The kitten is hiding under the chair. But Jane
is looking under the piano. Why do you think Jane is doing that?” This is a backward
reasoning task because children have to infer backwards from the protagonist’s action to her
underlying mental states. (E.g. Jane thinks that the kitten is under the piano.)
Following this, the corresponding privileged access question was: “What do you think, if
we asked Jane why she is looking for her kitten under the piano what would she say?” This
question relates to the possible verbal report concerning the mental states underlying Jane’s
action.
The second story is the following: “Sam wants to find his puppy. His puppy might be
hiding in the garage or under the porch. But Sam thinks his puppy is under the porch. Where
will Sam look for his puppy, in the garage or under the porch?” This is a forward reasoning
task because children have to infer forwards from the mental states of the protagonist to
his action. (E.g. Sam will look for his puppy under the porch.) So the Jane’s story and
the Sam’s story are different in terms of the direction of reasoning that is required from the
child’s part.
The privileged access pair of the above question looked like this: “What do you think, if
we asked Sam why he is looking for his puppy under the porch/garage what would he say?”
Each story was accompanied by a colourful drawing in order to help children to understand
the minimal narratives. The order of the two stories was counterbalanced among participants.
Coding. Originally we developed a coding system which consisted of eight categories. The
different answer categories were the following: (1) Does not know; (2) Mental states (e.g.,
“She is looking for her kitten in the kitchen because she thinks it is there); (3) Further reasons
for action (e.g., “. . . because she wants to play with it”); (4) The physical environment of
the drawings (e.g., “. . . because the garage is bigger”); (5) Goal (e.g., “. . . because she wants
to find her kitten); (6) Reality answer (e.g., . . . because her kitten is under the piano); (7)
Perception (e.g., “. . . because the last time she saw her kitten it was there”); (8) Other.
Later we simplified our category system. As our primary interest is in mindreading
and understanding the attribution of privileged access we divided children’s behavioural
explanation responses into two categories. One of the categories relates to the explanation in
terms of mental states (e.g., belief, thoughts etc.) and all the other accounts were grouped
into the second category.
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Table 4 Percentages of the different answers to the first question in Jane’s story.
Answer categories 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds
Does not know 4 20 4
Mental states 52 16 44
Further reasons for action 0 0 4
Physical environment in
the drawing
16 20 8
11 Goal 0 4 4
Mentioning location 20 16 12
Perception 0 16 12
Other 8 4 12
6.2 Results
The descriptive statistics of children’s answer in terms of the eight original categories is
shown in Tables 4-7. As the data in this tables did not lead to significant results we reduced
the categories into two as mentioned above.
Regarding our first story (the one with Jane as the main protagonist) 13 5-year-olds (52
percent) mentioned mental states in their behavioural explanation in response to the first
question. Interestingly, only four of the 6-year-olds (16 percent) did the same in response to
this question. Of the 7-year-olds eleven (44 percent) answered in terms of mental states to
this question. In all age groups the remaining children cited other reasons in their response
to this question. This result is significant (Chi-Square test: p<.05 (p=0.02)) presumably
because 6-year-olds mentioned mental states in their response less often.
In response to the privileged access question in the first story nine 5-year-olds (36 percent),
two six-year-olds (8 percent), and nine seven-year-olds (36 percent) cited mental states. The
remaining children did not make reference to psychological states in their answer to the
privileged access question. This finding is again significant (Chi-Square test: p<.05) for the
same reason as mentioned above.
Concerning our second story (the one with Sam as the main character) we made an analysis
of the responses to the second privileged access question as a function of the correct/incorrect
answer to the first question. Notice that in the story with Sam there exists a correct answer
to the first question i.e. Sam will search for his puppy where he thinks it is namely under the
porch. The data are presented in Table 8. This table shows that children who answered the
first question incorrectly gave much less mental-state-based explanations to the privileged
access question than those who answered it correctly (Chi-Square test: p<.01 (p=0.01).
6.3 Discussion
In response to the first question in the Jane story 6-year-olds mentioned mental states
less often than did 5-and 7-year-olds. This is a surprising result which may be due to
the fact that 5-year-olds mentioned the “She thinks . . . or she believes . . . ” phrases very
often. This is consistent with the general view of Wellman [40] according to whom a kind
of explicit belief-desire psychology emerges at the age of 4 and 5. Maybe the emergence of
this belief-desire psychology at that age means that this intuitive psychology becomes the
dominant explanatory framework and it is only a later developmental achievement that the
child considers other kinds of possible accounts as well. But this is only a partial explanation
and further research is needed in order to explain this decrease of mental state explanations
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Table 5 Percentages of the different answers to the second question in Jane’s story.
Answer categories 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds
Does not know 24 32 12
Mental states 36 8 36
Further reasons for action 12 0 0
Physical environment in
the drawing
0 20 8
Goal 0 0 0
Mentioning location 24 16 20
Perception 0 20 8
Other 4 4 16
Table 6 Percentages of the correct/incorrect answers to the first question in Sam’s story.
5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds
Sam’s first question
answered correctly
72 68 92
Sam’s first question
answered incorrectly
28 32 8
in the 6-year-olds. In fact, first we need to repeat this result on another sample to firmly
exclude the possibility of a sampling error.
A similar finding emerged in response to the privileged access question in the first Jane
story. In response to this question we expected children to verbally report on Jane’s mental
state but we got relatively few mental state accounts and the general trend was from the
children’s part to rationalise Jane’s behaviour. The decrease of mental state responses in the
6-year-olds can be explained as above.
Regarding our second story with Sam we can say that those children who could predict
Sam’s behaviour in terms of his mental state correctly gave significantly more mentalistic
explanations to the second privileged access question. This finding seems to suggest that
there is indeed a close conceptual connection between intuitive theory of mind (as assessed
by our first question) and the ascription of privileged access. This is the theoretical option
that we discussed in the introduction to our experiment, and further research is needed to
separate these two components (i.e. theory of mind and the attribution of privileged access).
That is, we have to examine younger children to assess this theoretical option.
In our experiment we tested the working of the folk functionalist theory by which children
interpret, explain and predict the behaviour of others using mental state terms. As we saw
above, 36 percent of the 5-year-old subjects cited mental states in their responses to the
privileged access questions in both stories. We have also seen that according to Mitchell et
al. [47] 5-year-olds have first-person authority. This raises the theoretical possibility that
children at first have privileged access concerning their own mental states and they attribute
privileged access to others only later. But this can mean that as soon as the child discovers
that she has privileged access she becomes able generalize this principle to others. This was
our original motivation to involve 5-to-7-year old subjects in our study: on the one hand it
seems fairly clear that they can attribute privileged access to themselves, and we wanted to
see how easily they proceed to understanding others’ privileged access. Our results suggest
that there may be some delay in this generalization.
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Table 7 Percentages of the different answers to the second question in Sam’s story.
Answer categories 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds
Does not know 24 32 8
Mental states 36 24 36
Further reasons for action 4 12 12
Physical environment in
the drawing
4 4 4
Goal 4 4 0
Mentioning location 16 20 28
Perception 0 4 4
Other 12 0 8
Table 8 Responses to the privileged access question in the Sam story as a function of the answers
to the first question: absolute number (per cent)
Mental-state-based ex-
planations
All other responses
First question correct 23 (31) 35 (47)
First question incorrect 1 (1.33) 16 (21)
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